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BAYESIAN NETWORKS AS A DECISION TOOL  
FOR O&M OF OFFSHORE WIND TURBINES 
 
J. J. Nielsen, Aalborg University, DK 
J. D. Sørensen, Aalborg University, DK 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Costs to operation and maintenance (O&M) of offshore wind turbines are large. This paper presents how 
influence diagrams can be used to assist in rational decision making for O&M. An influence diagram is a 
graphical representation of a decision tree based on Bayesian Networks. Bayesian Networks offer 
efficient Bayesian updating of a damage model when imperfect information from inspections/monitoring 
is available. The extension to an influence diagram offers the calculation of expected utilities for decision 
alternatives, and can be used to find the optimal strategy among different alternatives. The method is 
demonstrated through application examples. 
 
NOMENCLATURE 
 
O&M:  Operation and maintenance 
LIMID:  Limited memory influence diagram 
SPU:  Single policy updating 
MTBF:  Mean time between failures 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Optimal planning of operation and maintenance 
(O&M) has the potential of reducing the cost of 
energy from offshore wind turbines. The costs to 
O&M are large, up to 25-30% of the cost of 
energy, because a large number of failures of 
different components lead to costs to corrective 
maintenance and lost production. Some 
component failures can be avoided by using 
preventive maintenance strategies. Presently much 
focus is on condition based maintenance, where 
decisions on repairs are made based on the actual 
health of the system, see e.g. [1], [2], and [3]. 
Information on the condition of the components 
can be gained using inspections and online 
condition monitoring systems. Many monitoring 
methods are available, and these are subject to 
different levels of reliability. The large 
uncertainties connected to these methods introduce 
a risk of making non-optimal decisions, if the 
uncertainties are not dealt with. 
 
Rational planning of O&M could be based on risk-
based pre-posterior decision theory, where the 
decisions with minimal expected costs are made, 
see the wind turbine framework [4] and the basic 
theory in [5]. The optimal decisions can be found 
using a decision tree, if relevant utilities and 
probabilities are available. Application of risk-
based methods requires a probabilistic damage 
model, and the inspection/monitoring results can 
be used for Bayesian updating of the model. This 
can efficiently be done using Bayesian networks, 
see the framework for deterioration modelling in 
[6]. Bayesian networks can be extended with 
utility and decision nodes to form an influence 
diagram which is a graphical model of a decision 
tree. Such an approach has been used by [7] for 
inspection planning for fatigue cracks in offshore 
jacket structures. This paper focus on the 
application of influence diagrams for risk-based 
decision making in the context of repair of 
deteriorating wind turbine components. 
 
3. BAYESIAN NETWORKS 
 
This section gives a short introduction to Bayesian 
networks. Elaboration can be found in e.g. [8] and 
[9]. Bayesian networks were developed in 
computer science for modelling of artificial 
intelligence. This requires the ability of a 
computer to reason under uncertainty and to make 
rational decisions, while including new 
information in a consistent way. The name 
Bayesian network refers to Bayes rule for 
calculation of a posterior estimate P(A|B): 
 
𝑃 𝐴 𝐵 =
1
𝑃 𝐵 
𝑃 𝐵 𝐴 𝑃(𝐴) (1)  
 
where P(A) is the prior estimate, P(B|A) is the 
likelihood of A given B, and P(B) is the marginal 
probability of B. 
 
A Bayesian network is a graphical model that 
consists of nodes, representing variables, and 
directed links between them representing causal 
relationships. The relationships between variables 
are described using familiar terms, so if X causes 
Y, X is a parent of Y, and Y is a child of X. The 
probabilities are given as conditional probability 
distributions for each node, conditioned on the 
parents. The joint probability distribution of a 
network with n nodes can be found using the chain 
rule: 
 
𝑃(V) =  𝑃(A𝑖|𝑝𝑎(A𝑖))
𝑛
𝑖=1
 (2)  
 
where Ai is the i‟th variable and pa(Ai) means the 
parents of Ai. A node in a Bayesian network is 
independent of all other nodes, if the parents, 
children and parents of children are given. This set 
is called the Markov blanket. 
 
When evidence is received for a node, the joint 
distribution can be updated using Bayes rule, and 
posterior marginal distributions can be found. This 
task is called inference, and for a network where 
all nodes are discrete exact inference can be 
performed. Different efficient algorithms are 
developed, e.g. the junction tree algorithm. For 
nodes with continuous distributions it is in general 
not possible to perform exact inference, and 
approximate methods must be used, e.g. Markov 
chain Monte Carlo methods. 
 
2.1 DETERIORATION MODEL 
 
For modelling of deterioration it is necessary that 
the Bayesian network allows development of the 
damage size over time. For a Markovian process 
the state of a variable is independent of the past 
given the state at the previous time step. In general 
deterioration is not a Markovian process, but if 
time independent variables are introduced, the 
Markovian assumption holds for the damage size 
given these variables, see [6]. 
 
This gives the possibility of modelling a 
deterioration process using a dynamic Bayesian 
network consisting of equal time slices that each 
are connected only to the neighbouring time slices. 
The network then has the property that a time slice 
is independent of all earlier time slices given the 
previous slice. The Bayesian network is fully 
defined when the conditional probability 
distribution is given for each node conditioned on 
the parents. Each node has a finite number of 
mutually exclusive states, and the states are equal 
for the same node in different time slices. 
 
The Bayesian network modelling framework is 
usable for damages models, where the damage 
size at one time step can be calculated based on 
the damage size at the previous time step and 
some time-invariant and/or time-variant 
parameters, as shown in Figure 1. This is the case 
for e.g. damage models based on fracture 
mechanics and SN-curves. In is only necessary to 
include variables that should be modelled 
stochastic as nodes. Deterministic parameters can 
be included when calculating the conditional 
probability distributions. 
 
When no observations are included, the model can 
be used to find a prior estimate on the damage size 
at any time step, based on the prior distributions. 
When observations results are available they can 
be inserted as evidence, and a posterior estimate is 
found for parameters and damage size. For a 
perfect observation procedure the evidence can be 
inserted directly in the damage node. But for 
imperfect observations based on e.g. inspection 
and monitoring an observation node can with 
advantage be included. This is described in the 
section with application examples. 
 
 
 
3. O&M PLANNING 
 
A life cycle decision problem for O&M of 
offshore wind turbines includes decisions on the 
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Figure 1. Section of Bayesian network for deterioration 
modelling. After [6]. 
Time-invariant 
Time-variant 
Damage 
Observations 
initial design, inspections/monitoring, and repairs. 
Inspection/monitoring results give indication of 
the state of the components, and provide a better 
basis for making decisions on repairs. Rational 
planning implies making decisions that maximize 
the expected utility over the life time, including all 
available information at the time of decision.  
 
The utilities relevant for the analysis is the cost of 
initial design, cost of inspection/monitoring, and 
cost of repairs, both corrective and preventive. The 
utility of corrective repairs can alternatively be 
named the utility of component failure. In most 
structural analyses the probability of failure is very 
small, and the consequences are very high. But for 
wind turbines there are many component failures 
with limited consequences, and the components 
are repaired or replaced after failure. In addition 
component failures lead to costs due to lost 
production, which can be included in the costs to 
corrective repairs. 
 
The decision problem can be illustrated with the 
decision tree shown in Figure 2. But the size 
grows exponentially with the number of time steps, 
and the probabilities are hard to assess, see e.g. 
[10]. 
 
3.1 INFLUENCE DIAGRAM 
An influence diagram is a Bayesian network 
extended with utility and decision nodes shown as 
diamonds and rectangular boxes, respectively. 
Like the Bayesian network it provides efficient 
updating of a deterioration model, when indirect 
information is available, and in addition it includes 
the possibility to find expected utilities for 
 
  
 
 
decision alternatives. A simplified influence 
diagram for O&M planning is shown in Figure 3. 
 
In general decisions on actions can only change 
the state of variables in the direction of the links in 
the network, whereas evidence can propagate both 
ways, see [9]. A decision on an inspection does 
not change anything apart from the cost used for it, 
but the inspection result can change the belief 
about the state of the unobserved variables. A 
decision on repair will change the state of the 
component in the future, but the action will not 
change the past. 
 
For a diagram as the one shown in Figure 3 there 
are many decisions. In a traditional influence 
diagram there is an assumption of no-forgetting, 
meaning that the entire past is known at the time 
of the decision. When solving an influence 
D 
F 
Ins 
Rep 
R 
D 
F 
Ins 
Rep 
R 
D 
F 
Ins 
Rep 
R 
Figure 2. Decision tree for O&M planning [4]. 
Figure 3. Section of simplified influence diagram for O&M 
planning with nodes: F: utility of failure, D: damage size, 
Ins: inspection result, Rep: decision on repair, R: utility of 
preventive repair. 
diagram the optimal decision policy is found for 
each decision node, dependent on all earlier nodes, 
both decision and probability nodes. For an 
influence diagram with only one decision there is 
no problem, because all previous information is 
available at the time of the decision.  For a 
network with multiple decisions the same is the 
case, when the last decision is made. But when the 
other decisions are made is it necessary to know 
the policies for future decisions, in order to 
calculate the expected utilities used for finding 
optimal policies for the current decision. Thus the 
domain of a decision node increases exponentially 
with the number of previous nodes, and for a large 
network the problem becomes intractable, and it is 
necessary to use an approximation [11].  
 
 3.2 LIMITED MEMORY 
 
Approximations can be utilized in different ways. 
A no-forgetting influence diagram can be 
constructed in such a way that the present is 
blocked from the past, and only the previous time 
step has influence on the decision.  But for a 
decision problem as shown in Figure 3, which can 
be seen as a special case of a partially observed 
Markov decision process, this requires that the 
calculation of the damage size is not based on the 
previous damage size, and this is clearly not 
preferable. 
 
An alternative is to use a limited information 
influence diagram (LIMID) that was first 
presented in [12]. The LIMID relaxes the 
assumption of no-forgetting, and it is necessary to 
specify exactly what is known at the time of 
decision. This means that the optimal decision 
policy is calculated dependent on the parents, so 
the decision maker knows what decision to make 
for each possible outcome of the parents. However, 
it is still possible to enter evidence into the 
Bayesian network, when it becomes available, and 
this is taken into account in the calculations. But 
for future decisions it is assumed that the decision 
maker only has the evidence from the parents as 
basis, even though there will be more information 
available. For a decision on making an inspection, 
it is not taken into account, that the inspection will 
give valuable information for a later repair 
decision, unless the repair node has the given 
inspection node as parent.   
After defining the LIMID and all conditional 
probability distributions it is compiled into a 
junction tree. After this procedure evidence can be 
inserted, and the optimal strategy can be found 
using the single policy updating (SPU) algorithm, 
see [12]. The SPU algorithm finds a local 
maximum, by updating one decision at a time. 
When convergence is reached a decision with 
higher expected utility cannot be found by 
changing only one decision. However, there is no 
guarantee that the found strategy is also a global 
maximum. It might be possible to find a better 
strategy if two or more decisions are changed 
simultaneously.  
 
4. APPLICATION EXAMPLE 
 
This example shows how an influence diagram 
can be used for planning of preventive repairs for 
components exposed to deterioration processes. 
The model is generic and other damage and 
inspections models than the chosen ones can easily 
be adopted. It is assumed that inspections are 
performed every year in connection with service 
visits. Based on the inspection results a decision is 
made on whether a repair should be performed. 
 
4.1 DAMAGE MODEL 
 
The component is assumed to have a mean time 
between failures (MTBF) of 8 years, and the 
damage size, D, is measured on a relative scale, 
where a damage size larger than 1 is in the failure 
domain. An exponential damage model based on 
Paris‟ law for crack propagation is used, where the 
increase in damage size per stress cycle dD/dN is 
found using: 
 
𝑑𝐷
𝑑𝑁
= 𝐶 Δ𝐾𝑚  (3)  
 
where C and m are model parameters and ΔK is 
the stress intensity factor range. The stress ranges 
are assumed to follow a Weibull distribution with 
scale and shape parameters A and B, and the 
differential equation can be solved to give the 
following, see [7]: 
 
𝐷𝑖 =  𝐷𝑖−1
2−𝑚
2
  
+ Δ𝐾 𝑀𝑈𝐴𝑡
𝑚 
2
2−𝑚
 (4)  
where MU is models the time invariant 
uncertainties, and the stress intensity factor range 
is found using: 
 
Δ𝐾 = 𝐶 𝑁 Γ  1 +
𝑚
𝐵
 𝑌𝑚𝜋
𝑚
2
  1 −
𝑚
2
  (5)  
 
where N is the number of stress cycles per year, 
and Y is a geometry constant. The model is 
calibrated using Crude Monte Carlo simulations to 
give a MTBF of 8 years, when a time step of one 
year is used. The values and distributions for the 
parameters are given in Table 1. It is assumed that 
the damage growth follows the above model from 
the beginning, where the initial damage size is D0, 
i.e. a damage initiation time is not considered. 
 
Table 1. Damage parameters and distributions. 
Variable Distribution Mean CoV 
m Deterministic 3 - 
C Deterministic 6E-12 - 
B Deterministic 0.66 - 
Y Deterministic 1 - 
N Deterministic 1E6/year - 
D0 Exponential 0.02 100% 
Ai Normal 5.35 MPa 18% 
MU Normal 1 18% 
 
4.2 INSPECTION MODEL 
 
It is important that the inspections are modelled as 
realistic as possible, and takes the present 
uncertainties into account. In this example two 
types of uncertainty are considered; the probability 
of detection of a damage and the measurement 
accuracy.   
 
The probability of detection (PoD) is dependent on 
the inspection procedure, as a more expensive and 
throughout inspection gives a higher probability 
that a present damage is found. For a chosen 
inspection procedure it is in general more probable 
to detect a large damage than a small, and the PoD 
is given as function of the damage size (D). For 
this example an exponential PoD model is chosen, 
with parameters P0 = 1 and λ = 0.4:  
 
𝑃𝑜𝐷 𝐷 = 𝑃0(1 − exp −𝐷 𝜆  ) (6)  
The accuracy of the measurement of the damage 
size is modelled by an additive model, where the 
correct damage size equals the measured damage  
size, Dm, plus a normal distributed error term, ε, 
with mean zero and standard deviation 0.05: 
 
𝐷 = 𝐷𝑚 + 𝜀 (7)  
 
4.3 LIMID FOR DETERIORAITON 
 
The LIMID for making optimal repair decisions 
for deteriorating components are shown in Figure 
4, and is described in the following. 
 
The LIMID is modelled in the program Hugin [13], 
and all nodes have to be discrete. Thus the 
continuous variables MUi, Ai, and Di have to be 
discretized. Different discretization schemes have 
been tried out and compared to the results 
obtained by Crude Monte Carlo simulation. In the 
final scheme the nodes Ai and MUi have 10 states 
each, and Di has 30 states. 
 
Both Ai and MUi are discretized with intervals of 
equal sizes, except for the end intervals that are 
lumped. The interval boundaries are given as  
 
−∞,−3𝜎:
6𝜎
8
: 3𝜎,∞ (8)  
 
where σ is the standard deviation. 
For the damage size, Di, an exponential increasing 
interval size is used, because the damage model is 
exponential, as proposed in [6]. The interval 
boundaries between 0 and infinity are given as the 
following, and are shown in Figure 5: 
D0 D1 
FC1 
Ins1 
R1 
RC1 
D2 
FC2 
Ins2 
R2 
RC2 
F1 F2 
A1 A2 
MU MU1 MU2 
Figure 4. Section of LIMID for calculating optimal repair 
decisions. F: failure, R: repair, Ins: inspection. 
 
exp ln 10−4 ∶
ln 1 − ln 10−4 
28
: ln 1   (9)  
 
 
Figure 5. Upper interval boundaries for the node Di. 
 
The last interval of Di corresponds to failure, but a 
binary node, Fi, with states 0 and 1 meaning no 
failure and failure respectively are also included. 
This node is necessary for entering the evidence 
that failure has not occurred as hard evidence. A 
utility node, Fci, is connected to failure node, and 
the utility of failure corresponds to the cost of a 
corrective repair and the associated downtime. The 
utility of failure is set to -50 k€.  
 
Inspections are modelled by a node, Insi, with the 
same states as Di plus the state no detection. Based 
on the inspection results it is decided whether a 
repair should be carried out. The cost is modelled 
by the utility node, RCi, and the utility of a 
preventive repair is set to -10 k€. A decision node 
on repair has, besides the current inspection result, 
also the previous repair decision as parents. This 
has been done to avoid that the SPU algorithm is 
stuck at a local maximum, where a higher utility 
can be found by moving a repair one time step 
backwards or forwards.  
 
Both corrective and preventive repairs at time step 
i-1 affect the damage size at time step i, and has to 
be taken into account when the conditional 
probability distribution for Di is calculated. If a 
repair of either type is performed, Di is calculated 
using (4) with the distribution of D0 instead of Di-1. 
 
The discrete probability tables for the nodes 
without parents, MU, Ai, and D0, are found exact 
by truncation of the continuous distributions. MU 
is a time invariant variable, and therefore MUi is 
the identity matrix. The conditional probability 
tables for Di and Insi are found using Monte Carlo 
simulation.  
 
4.5 RESULTS 
 
In order to demonstrate the capabilities of the 
LIMID, three different cases are examined. Case 
A is a simple case, where all inspections result in 
no detection. Cases B and C are more realistic 
cases, as the inspection results are chosen as 
realizations from the prior distributions. The 
observations for nine years are shown for all cases 
in Table 2. 
 
Table 2. Observations for three cases, N means 
no detection, F means failure, and a number 
refers to the interval number. 
Year 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Case A N N N N N N N N N 
Case B N N N 19 21 24 27 F F 
Case C N 18 21 23 N 26 28 28 F 
 
Evidence is entered in the LIMID for one year at a 
time, and the expected utility of each decision is 
found. Both the inspection result and the fact that 
no failure has occurred yet are entered as evidence. 
The LIMID in Figure 4 is extended to i=20, 
corresponding to a design life of 20 years. It is 
necessary to include the entire life time in the 
model, in order to get the correct expected utilities. 
 
Figure 6 shows the probability of failure for each 
time step, calculated based on the information 
available in the previous time step, and Figure 7 
shows the expected utility for decisions on repair.  
 
In case A all inspections results in no detection. 
This implies that the failure probability is almost 
constant after the 6
th
 year, because it is unlikely to 
have a large damage, when none of the inspections 
indicate so. The utility of repairing remains lower 
that the utility of not repairing, so no repair should 
be performed. 
In case B the first three inspections also results in 
no detection, and the curves here are equal to the 
ones in case A. But a damage is detected in the 4
th
 
year, and this gives a drop in the failure 
probability because the damage size it is now 
known with less uncertainty that before the 
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detection. After the inspection in year 7, the 
probability of failure in year 8 is around 50%, and 
thus the utility of repair exceeds the utility of no 
repair – implying that a repair should be 
performed. 
 
In case C the damage is detected in year 2, and the 
probability of failure drops as in case B. The 
inspections year 3 and 4 results in detection of a 
larger damage, so the probability of failure 
increases. In year 5 the damage is not detected, but 
even so it is known from the earlier inspections 
that damage is present, and the updated probability 
of failure in year 6 is around 12%. This gives a 
risk of failure of 0.12 ⋅ 50 = 6  k€, which is 
actually smaller than the repair cost of 10 k€. But 
because the repair cannot be avoided but only 
postponed a year or two, the expected utility of 
repair here exceeds the utility of no repair. 
 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
 
The paper presents how LIMIDs can be used for 
risk-based planning of O&M for offshore wind 
turbines. Bayesian graphical models are well 
suited for the job because they allow efficient 
Bayesian updating of the damage model, when 
information becomes available. Traditional no-
forgetting influence diagrams are in general not 
possible to solve in practical applications because 
of computational difficulties, but a LIMID where 
the no-forgetting assumption is relaxed can be 
used instead. However, this results in an 
approximate model, and it is necessary to check 
that the model does in fact find the optimal 
solution. 
 
An application example illustrated how a LIMID 
can be used for risk based planning of repairs. It 
can be used for real time decision making, as the 
optimal decision is updated, when new 
information is entered. Specific damage and 
inspection models were chosen, but the model is in 
principle generic and can easily be changed to 
model another case. 
 
Figure 6. Probability of failure based on evidence until the 
previous time step for case A, B, and C. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7. Expected utilities for decisions on repairs for each 
time step for the three cases.  
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